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Dancing with Wolves:
Syndicated Loans and the Economics of Multiple Lenders
Banking scholars have viewed a 
firm’s passage from borrowing from a 
single lender to using multiple lenders 
(and finally to borrowing on public 
bond markets) as an inevitable char-
acteristic of the life cycle of a growing 
firm. According to this view, small 
firms borrow from a single bank, mid-
dle-market firms borrow from multiple 
banks, and large firms use multiple 
sources of finance. While there is a 
strong element of truth in this view, it 
is also very incomplete. The underly-
ing economics of this decision involves 
more than simply asking whether the 
firm’s revenues are large enough to 
cover the transaction costs of adding 
one or more lenders (e.g., providing 
another set of financial statements) or 
the costs of getting a public debt rat-
ing.1 Recent research has shown that 
the number of lenders fundamentally 
affects the nature of the firm’s relation-
ship with its lenders.
In the U.S., the syndicated loan
market is a particularly useful laborato-
ry for exploring the economics of mul-
tiple lenders. (See Syndicated Loans.) 
A syndicated loan is one in which the 
loan is parceled among a number of 
banks, ranging from two lenders to 
more than 30 in some cases.2  From 
the firm’s side, we can think of the 
syndicated loan as a formal substitute 
for negotiating and signing a bunch 
of separate agreements with multiple 
lenders on its own. Everything else 
equal, the firm — especially a large 
firm — can borrow at a lower loan rate 
when no single lender is too heavily 
exposed to that firm.  When a bank 
has a well-diversified loan portfolio, 
losses on a single loan will lower the 
lender’s profits but will not threaten 
the lender’s solvency. In turn, the lend-
er can charge a lower rate because the 
loan poses less risk to the return on 
the lender’s entire portfolio.  Accord-
firm’s passage from borrowing from a single 
lender to using multiple lenders is often 
viewed as an inevitable progression in the life 
of a firm. While there is a strong element of 
truth in this view, it is also incomplete. The underlying 
economics of moving from one lender to many involves 
more than simply asking whether the firm’s revenues are 
large enough to cover the costs of adding more lenders 
or of acquiring a public debt rating. The U.S. syndicated 
loan market provides a useful laboratory for exploring the 
economics of multiple lenders. In this article, Mitchell 
Berlin discusses recent research on the syndicated loan 
market that has attempted to answer questions related to 
firms’ use of multiple lenders.
1 One piece of evidence that firm size alone 
doesn’t explain the number of lenders is that 
there is substantial international variation in 
the number of lenders used by firms of similar 
size.  For a sample of middle market and 
large firms, Steven Ongena and David Smith 
document that the median number of lenders 
ranges from over 10 in Italy and Portugal to 
just two banks in Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland. A sample of U.S. firms 
comparable in size to those in Ongena and 
Smith’s sample would have a median of three 
or four. There is a growing literature that seeks 
to explain these differences in the number of 
lenders per firm. The results from this literature 
are still preliminary, and I don’t discuss them in 
this article.  
2 Although commercial banks make the lion’s 
share of syndicated loans, other types of 
intermediaries, including finance companies, 
investment banks, and hedge funds, also hold 
syndicated loans.  Indeed, finance companies 
and investment banks are sometimes lead 
arrangers.  Since nothing in this article hinges 
on the distinctions among different types of 
lenders, I will often use the terms bank and 
lender interchangeably. 2   Q3  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
* U.S. bank regulators collect information on all syndicated loans, loan commitments, standby letters of credit, and leases with a value greater than 
$20 million that are held by at least three lenders in the shared national credit (SNC) program.
Syndicated Loans
T
he U.S. syndicated loan market has 
grown very rapidly in the last 10 years: 
from $137 million of new syndicated 
loans in 1987 to well over $1 trillion in 
2006 (see the Figure).  From the lender’s 
standpoint, the syndicated loan is an 
efficient way to lend to its larger customers while main-
taining a diversified loan portfolio. The originating bank 
keeps a fraction of the loan — the amount depends on 
contractual issues that I discuss at length in the text of 
this article — while the majority of the loan is held on 
the books of the other syndicate members.  
In a syndicated loan, the contract is negotiated 
between a lead bank and the borrower. Currently, 62 per-
cent of the deals are originated by three lead banks — JP 
Morgan (29 percent), Bank of America (18 percent), and 
Citigroup (15 percent) — with no other bank originat-
ing more than 6 percent of the deals. During the recent 
wave of loans to finance mergers, investment banks such 
as Goldman Sachs have played an increasingly prominent 
role. Commonly, multiple loans are negotiated at the 
same time; for example, the deal may include both a line 
of credit and a term loan.  
After the terms are negotiated, pieces of the loan are 
then sold to other lenders, each of which holds a pro rata 
share of the original loan. Legally, each member of the 
syndicate has a separate agreement with the borrower. 
Thus, unlike certain types of loan sales or many mort-
gage-backed securities — in which the cash flows and 
collateral from the original loan can be sliced and diced 
in many ways — each member of the syndicate has a loan 
that differs only in its size. The main formal responsibility 
of the lead bank is to service the loan, that is, to receive 
and distribute loan payments to syndicate members, 
oversee the collateral, and so forth. I use the word formal
because bank regulations require all syndicate members 
to perform due diligence and to monitor the loan, no 
matter how small their share. In practice, the lead bank 
takes disproportionate responsibility for monitoring the 
borrower.  
There is significant variation in the structure of syn-
dicated loans, and the size of the borrowing firm is the 
single most important factor determining the structure. 
Using the sample from Amir Sufi’s article, which includes 
over 12,000 syndicated deals from 1992 to 2003, the total 
sales of the borrowers range from $48 million (10th per-
centile), to $367 million (50th percentile), to $3.5 billion 
(90th percentile). Thus, borrowers in the syndicated loan 
market range from middle-market firms to the very larg-
est firms in the world. In Sufi’s sample, deal sizes range 
from $40 million (10th percentile), to $150 million (50th
percentile), to $8.5 billion (90th percentile).* To gain some 
perspective, $1 million is the usual ceiling that empirical 
researchers use to define a small business loan.
Syndicate size ranges from two lenders (10th percen-
tile), to five lenders (50th percentile), to 18 lenders (90th
percentile), and the share of the loan retained by the lead 
bank ranges from 8 percent (10th percentile), to 24 per-
cent (50th percen-
tile), to 56 percent 
(90th percentile). 
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ing to this logic, lenders and borrowers 
will seek to achieve maximum diver-
sification by increasing the number of 
lenders as much as possible (subject to 
the additional transaction costs of bor-
rowing from multiple banks).
But lender diversification is not 
the only factor that affects the cost 
of borrowing through a syndicated 
loan. Steven Dennis and Donald Mul-
lineaux have described syndicated 
lending as an intermediate form of 
financing on a continuum ranging 
from relationship lending — which 
involves close and continuous moni-
toring of the firm by its lender — to 
transactional lending — which involves 
arm’s length interactions between the 
borrowing firm and its lender(s). The 
size and structure of loan syndicates 
and the structure of syndicated loan 
contracts provide evidence about the 
terms of the tradeoffs a firm faces 
when it moves from a single lender to 
multiple lenders.3 Indeed, it is useful to 
think of the loan syndicate as an insti-
tution designed to govern the interac-
tions between the firm and its lenders 
and between the lenders. Factors such 
as the share held by the lead bank, 
the number and identity of syndicate 
members, and, for that matter, the loan 
contract itself are designed to balance 
the benefits and costs of using multiple 
lenders.  
Some of the questions that can 
be addressed by examining the syn-
dicated loan market are: What types 
of firms borrow through syndicated 
loans? What is the optimal number of 
lenders? How does increasing the num-
ber of lenders affect banks’ ability to 
monitor firms? And to what extent do 
lending syndicates facilitate or inhibit 
3 Existing evidence doesn’t permit us to quantify 
the share of the syndicated loan market among 
all loans made to borrowers who use multiple 
lenders.
contract renegotiation? In the last few 
years, researchers have made a lot of 
progress in answering these questions.
MULTIPLE LENDERS REDUCE 
THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
Lending Relationships Create 
Informational Monopolies. From the 
firm’s standpoint, maintaining a close, 
continuing lending relationship with 
a single bank has numerous benefits. 
Notably, the lender becomes better 
informed about the firm’s business 
over time. For example, an essentially 
healthy firm’s cash flows might drop 
temporarily. A bank with long experi-
ence lending to the firm can more 
easily distinguish temporary financial 
difficulties from the beginnings of 
more serious financial problems and is 
less likely to mistakenly seek to protect 
itself by raising the firm’s loan rate, 
cutting its credit line, or increasing 
collateral requirements. 
But much of the knowledge gained 
through years of experience is soft 
information; that is, it can’t necessar-
ily be easily coded and transmitted to 
another lender.  This gives the firm’s 
banker an informational advantage 
over potential competitors and endows 
the firm’s bank with a degree of mo-
nopoly power over its long-time bor-
rowers.  For example, even if the firm’s 
financial problems are temporary, the 
firm’s bank might nonetheless take the 
opportunity to raise the firm’s loan 
rate — an example of what contract 
theorists call the hold-up problem. Of 
course, the firm can threaten to take 
its business to another lender. But any 
new bank faces an inference problem 
because it knows less about the firm 
than the firm’s long-time lender. The 
potential lender will reason: “If we 
actually succeed in capturing the firm’s 
business, it’s likely that the firm’s cur-
rent lender knows something we don’t 
and the firm’s problems really are seri-
ous.”  Accordingly, the potential com-
petitor will make the loan only at a 
high loan rate, if at all.  Since potential 
competition is weakened by the origi-
nal lender’s informational monopoly, 
long-term borrowers will pay higher 
than a fully competitive rate and long-
time lenders can capture what econo-
mists call informational rents.
Empirical Evidence of Hold-Up 
Problems in Banking. Recently, 
financial economists have found 
convincing evidence that hold-up 
problems are not just a theoretical pos-
sibility. In her working paper, Carola 
Schenone follows a sample of firms 
for a number of years before and after 
their initial public offering (IPO), when 
they first sell stock to the public. A 
private firm — a firm whose stock is 
held by a small number of investors 
— is not required by law or by custom 
to publish detailed information about 
its profitability. However, after it sells 
stock to the wider public in an IPO, 
a firm is required by law to provide 
a lot of information to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
primary regulator in securities markets; 
this information is also available to the 
investing public. In addition, publicly 
traded firms are closely followed by 
financial analysts, who make a living 
evaluating the prospects of the firms 
they cover. So, when a firm goes pub-
lic, more market participants are actu-
ally producing information about the 
firm. Schenone finds that following an 
IPO, the firm’s main bank lender im-
mediately begins charging lower loan 
rates to the firm, evidence that the 
bank originally had an informational 
monopoly but that wider availability of 
information about the firm has under-
mined its monopoly power.
João Santos and Andrew Winton’s 
article examines how lending relation-
ships change when information about 
firms becomes routinely available.  
They examine two groups of firms: 
firms that have access to public debt 4   Q3  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
markets and bank-dependent firms.4
Unlike the case with firms that bor-
row exclusively from banks (and other 
private lenders such as finance com-
panies), a significant amount of public 
information is routinely available about 
firms that sell bonds. Santos and Win-
ton show that bank-dependent firms 
pay higher rates than firms that have 
access to bond markets. They also 
show that while all firms pay higher 
bank loan rates in recessions — be-
cause the risk of default is higher dur-
ing recessions — loan rates rise more 
for bank-dependent firms.5 This is con-
sistent with the view that banks’ mar-
ket power over borrowers is greatest 
when their private information is most 
valuable, that is, when other potential 
lenders’ concerns about a firm’s credit-
worthiness are likely to be greatest.
Joel Houston and Christopher 
James’s article provides evidence that 
multiple banks reduce hold-up prob-
lems.  A firm heavily engaged in R&D 
4 The authors define a firm as bank-dependent 
in two ways: (1) if it has never issued public 
debt; or (2) if its last bond issue was a private 
placement. Their results hold under either 
definition. It is worth noting that Santos and 
Winton’s sample of bank-dependent borrowers 
includes firms that have a single lender and 
firms that borrow from multiple banks. This 
sampling decision assumes that hold-up 
problems do not completely disappear when a 
firm uses more than one bank.  Interestingly, 
Santos and Winton find that bank-dependent 
borrowers are less likely to take out successive 
loans from the same bank than borrowers with 
access to public debt markets. This suggests 
that bank-dependent borrowers seek to exploit 
interbank competition more than borrowers 
for whom public bond markets provide an 
alternative to banks. Thus, hold-up problems 
appear to be relevant for firms borrowing from 
multiple lenders through syndicated loans.
5 The sophisticated reader will wonder whether 
loan rates rose disproportionately because of 
some (unmeasured) firm characteristic that 
affected both loan rates and access to public 
debt markets. The authors address this concern 
using instrumental variables. The basic idea of 
this technique is to find factors that plausibly 
affect a firm’s access to bond markets but have 
no direct effect on loan spreads, for example, 
inclusion in the S&P 500 index or membership 
in the NYSE.
6 I’m simplifying Houston and James’s results 
a little. Although they do present results for 
R&D, their main result is that firms with larger 
growth opportunities, that is, profitable future 
investments, rely less on bank debt when they 
have a single lender and more on bank debt 
when they have multiple bank lenders.  They 
measure growth opportunities by Tobin’s Q: 
the market value of the firm’s assets divided 
by the book value of the firm’s assets.  A value 
of Q higher than 1 indicates the existence of 
growth opportunities (as valued by stock market 
participants).
Although not all firms that borrow from multiple 
banks take out syndicated loans, we can think 
of the loan syndicate as an institution designed 
specifically to mitigate the problems that arise 
with multiple lenders.
7 In addition, the possibility of capturing 
informational rents increases banks’ incentives 
to monitor the firm, as shown by Giovanni 
Dell'Ariccia and Robert Marquez.
may be particularly prone to being held 
up by its lender because the firm’s pros-
pects depend heavily on activities for 
which information is neither publicly 
available nor easy to interpret.  Indeed, 
the profitability of much R&D activity 
depends crucially on the information 
being kept secret from other market 
participants.  Houston and James show 
that firms with larger R&D expendi-
tures reduce their reliance on bank 
debt if they borrow from a single bank. 
In contrast, for those firms that bor-
row from multiple banks, larger R&D 
expenditures are associated with more 
bank debt. These results suggest that 
firms at severe risk of hold-up — firms 
with a single bank lender — reduce 
their lender’s bargaining power by 
reducing indebtedness; when the firm 
has multiple lenders, it can take on 
more debt with less risk of hold-up.6
That said, although a firm with heavy 
R&D expenditures may have a strong 
incentive to diversify its funding sourc-
es, hard-to-interpret information also 
tends to limit the number of potential 
lenders (as I discuss in detail in the 
next section). 
While borrowing from multiple 
banks may reduce the severity of the 
hold-up problem, having multiple lend-
ers also creates its own set of problems. 
Studying the structure of loan syndi-
cates and syndicated loan contracts 
provides insights into these problems. 
Although not all firms that borrow 
from multiple banks take out syndi-
cated loans, we can think of the loan 
syndicate as an institution designed 
specifically to mitigate the problems 
that arise with multiple lenders. As a 
fast-growing segment of the corporate 
debt market, the market for syndicated 
loans is also interesting in its own 
right. 
INCENTIVES TO MONITOR 
DECLINE WHEN THERE ARE 
MULTIPLE LENDERS
In the modern theory of the bank-
ing firm, banks are viewed as special-
ists both in evaluating the creditwor-
thiness of borrowers (screening) and in 
keeping close tabs on borrowers once 
they have taken out a loan (monitor-
ing).  (From now on I’ll use the word 
monitoring to refer to both screen-
ing and monitoring.) A single lender 
that holds a borrower’s entire loan 
is exposed to all of the losses should 
the loan go bad. Thus, we expect this 
bank to have a strong incentive to 
monitor the firm closely.7 However, the 
lower the bank’s share of the loan, the Business Review  Q3  2007   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
smaller its exposure to loss and the less 
incentive it has to monitor the loan 
closely. So a large number of banks 
holding small pieces of the total loan 
would have little reason to monitor at 
all.  
This limits the amount of the loan 
that can be syndicated. Some bank 
must hold a large enough share of the 
loan to provide adequate incentives to 
monitor the borrower on behalf of all 
lenders. In loan syndicates, the largest 
share of the loan is held by the lead 
bank, which typically holds approxi-
mately one-quarter of the borrower’s 
loan for the median size syndicated 
loan.8 Of course, the requirement that 
a single bank retain a substantial share 
of the loan reduces the potential risk 
diversification benefits of syndicat-
ing the loan. The share of the loan 
retained by the lead bank balances the 
gains from providing the lead bank 
with proper incentives to monitor the 
firm against the lost diversification 
benefits. The efficient balance will be 
different for different types of borrow-
ers.
In particular, we expect that the 
relative difficulty of providing proper 
incentives to the lead banker to moni-
tor will be more important for informa-
tionally opaque firms, that is, firms for 
which information is not readily avail-
able or easily interpreted. When syn-
dicate members have less information 
about the firm, they must rely more on 
the lead bank to keep tabs on the bor-
rowing firm on their behalf. 
But how can we measure informa-
tional opacity? Empirical researchers 
have ranked firms using a firm’s degree 
of integration into public securities 
markets as an indicator of opacity. A 
firm that has gone public through an 
IPO must routinely provide informa-
tion to the SEC, and market partici-
pants can readily access this informa-
tion. Firms that also have a public debt 
rating from an agency like Standard 
and Poor’s are subject to an even high-
er level of scrutiny in the marketplace. 
So we can rank firms from the opaque 
(private firms), to moderately opaque 
(public firms without rated debt), to 
transparent (public firms with a debt 
rating).
In their article, Dennis and Mul-
lineaux show that the likelihood of a 
loan’s being syndicated at all is greater 
for public firms than it is for private 
firms and that it is greater yet for 
firms with a debt rating. A reasonable 
interpretation of this result is that a 
syndicated loan must yield diversifica-
tion benefits high enough to at least 
overcome the fixed costs of organizing 
the syndicate, for example, hiring the 
lawyers to write documents, and so 
forth. For sufficiently opaque borrow-
ers, the lead bank would have to hold 
such a large share of the loan that the 
diversification benefits would be simply 
too small to cover these costs. Further-
more, Amir Sufi’s article shows that 
for loans that actually are syndicated, 
the share of the loan retained by the 
lead bank is higher and the syndicate 
is likely to be smaller for more opaque 
firms.
The identity of the syndicate 
members also depends on the infor-
mational opacity of the firm. Sufi 
shows that for more opaque firms, 
syndicate members are more likely to 
be located in the same state as the 
firm and are also more likely to have 
lent to the firm in the past. In both 
cases, the bank is likely to have greater 
familiarity with the firm, even though 
there may be little publicly available 
information about the firm.9 Consis-
tent with the view that the share of 
the loan retained by the lead bank is 
related to its role in monitoring opaque 
firms, Sufi’s findings show that for 
transparent firms — those that have 
a public debt rating — there is no 
relationship between borrowers’ credit 
rating and the share held by the lead 
bank. Thus, it is not the risk of the 
firm, per se, but the syndicate mem-
bers’ information about the firm that is 
important. 
MULTIPLE LENDERS CREATE 
COORDINATION PROBLEMS
Large Syndicates Impede 
Efficient Renegotiation. Banking 
scholars argue that lending 
relationships facilitate flexibility 
through loan renegotiation. While it 
is relatively easy for a single lender to 
renegotiate loan terms with a borrower, 
it may be very difficult for many 
lenders to coordinate in negotiations. 
Furthermore, heterogeneous lenders 
— for example, lenders with widely 
varying exposures to the borrower — 
8 Note that by delegating the task of monitoring 
to the lead bank, which retains a large share of 
the loan, the loan syndicate also avoids wasteful 
duplication of effort by the syndicate members.
9 Sufi also finds that for opaque borrowers, 
syndicate members are more likely to have been 
members of past syndicates that included the 
lead bank. This suggests that reputation effects 
may be important. A lead bank is less likely 
to shirk its task of monitoring if it knows that 
angry syndicate members will refuse to join 
future lending syndicates formed by that lead 
bank.
For sufficiently opaque borrowers, the lead 
bank would have to hold such a large share of 
the loan that the diversification benefits would 
be simply too small to cover these costs.6   Q3  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
may find it hard to coordinate.10 This 
has implications for both the size and 
the structure of loan syndicates.
In my article with Loretta Mester, 
we argue that flexibility is a key feature 
of bank loans and that renegotiation 
and monitoring are intertwined. Once 
a bank grants a loan, it continues to 
monitor the firm through a number 
of different devices. One device is the 
loan covenant, a contractual restric-
tion that, for example, might require 
the borrower to keep its net worth 
above some level or keep its liquid 
assets above some minimum level. 
These covenants are tripwires. If the 
firm’s net worth falls below some level, 
this is an occasion for a more detailed 
investigation by the bank. If the bank 
determines that the firm is essentially 
healthy, it will renegotiate the loan 
terms to avoid placing the firm in 
default. However, multiple lenders, 
especially multiple lenders whose inter-
ests are not identical, are a barrier to 
negotiation. In a large loan syndicate, 
the originator of the loan can predict 
that renegotiations will not be easy to 
coordinate, and contracts will include 
less stringent covenants.  In this sense, 
large syndicates can undermine the 
use of covenants as a monitoring de-
vice.
Large Syndicates May Be 
Designed to Impede Negotiations.
According to the preceding view, 
barriers to negotiation lead to 
excessive default, and syndicates 
will be designed to achieve as much 
flexibility as possible. A second view, 
however, has been emphasized by 
Patrick Bolton and David Scharfstein. 
When it is easy to renegotiate a 
loan, a borrower may take excessive 
risks or act in other ways that would 
reduce the firm’s ability to repay the 
loan in full. If lenders can’t credibly 
threaten to liquidate the firm — for 
example, if the firm’s assets are much 
more valuable when the firm remains 
a going venture — the firm knows 
its lenders have a weak bargaining 
hand. The borrower knows its lenders 
will want to renegotiate the loan to 
minimize their losses, rather than 
punish the firm by imposing a default. 
However, syndicates can be designed 
to make renegotiation more difficult. 
Increasing the number of lenders in 
a syndicate or including members 
with a strong incentive to hold out 
in negotiations may discipline the 
borrower (who can’t assume that he 
can bargain his way out of default).11
Evidence Shows That Ease of 
Renegotiation Is Valuable. Cov-
enants are pervasive in syndicated 
loan agreements. In his working pa-
per, Sufi finds that over 60 percent 
of loan syndications have at least one 
financial covenant. Furthermore, 
covenants are set tightly. Ilia Dichev 
and Douglas Skinner find that over 
30 percent of the loans in their sample 
suffer covenant violations, many of 
them multiple times. They report that 
most of the covenant violations are 
technical violations — that is, the firm 
does not actually miss a loan payment 
— and that covenant violations typi-
cally lead to renegotiation rather than 
default. Thus, the firms that violate 
covenants in Dichev and Skinner’s 
sample are having financial difficul-
ties, but few are in serious financial 
distress. This evidence is consistent 
with our view that syndicates permit 
routine monitoring through covenants 
without leading to too many inefficient 
defaults.12
The combination of stringent 
contracts and flexibility will be most 
valuable for certain types of borrowers. 
For example, in the model used in my 
study with Mester, tight covenants are 
most valuable for borrowers with high 
credit risk. These borrowers can lower 
their borrowing costs by accepting 
tight covenants that restrict their op-
portunities for taking excessive risks. 
But tight covenants also increase the 
likelihood that the firm will find itself 
in breach of a covenant, even though 
the firm is basically healthy. For such 
firms, the option to renegotiate is most 
valuable.
Evidence Shows That Syndicates 
Are Designed to Inhibit Renegotia-
tion for High-Risk Firms.H o w e v e r ,  
in his working paper, Sufi finds that 
syndicate size is typically larger for 
firms with worse credit ratings, an 
empirical finding that appears incon-
10 This has been empirically verified by Stuart 
Gilson, Kose John, and Larry Lang, among 
others.
11 In Bolton and Scharfstein’s model, the central 
tradeoff is that multiple borrowers impose more 
discipline on borrowers but lead to excessive 
default when the borrower has bad luck.  The 
optimal number of creditors weighs these two 
factors. 
12 Mark Pyles and Donald Mullineaux also 
present some fascinating but preliminary 
evidence about contractual restrictions on 
syndicate members’ ability to resell their loans.  
In their sample of rated firms between 1999 
and 2003, over two-thirds of the loans have 
at least one of three types of restrictions on 
resale, which include requiring the borrower’s or 
the lead bank’s approval to sell or a minimum 
amount (usually $5 million) that can be sold.  
The authors find that resale restrictions are 
more likely for lower rated firms. The most 
likely interpretation of Pyles and Mullineaux’s 
findings is that the originator seeks to control 
the size of the syndicate for firms more likely to 
face financial problems. This is a particularly 
interesting area for further research.
Covenants are perva-
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sistent with the model in my study 
with Mester because larger syndicates 
face larger coordination problems. In-
terestingly, Sufi shows that the larger 
syndicate is created by adding lend-
ers with very small shares. He argues 
convincingly that the designer of the 
syndicate is explicitly creating a class 
of lenders that will hold out in any 
negotiations because their exposure 
to loss is small. The addition of this 
fringe of lenders with small exposures 
will tend to create serious coordination 
problems should contracts need to be 
renegotiated. 13
A Possible Reconciliation of 
Two Views. In fact, Sufi’s evidence 
that syndicates are designed to inhibit 
renegotiation in the event of default 
and Dichev and Skinner’s evidence 
that syndicate loan contracts are 
both stringent and routinely renegoti-
ated are not necessarily inconsistent 
because the contractual conditions 
for renegotiating various types of con-
tractual terms differ.14  The standard 
syndicate contract requires unanimous 
consent of all syndicate members for 
the renegotiation of the core contrac-
tual terms: the loan rate, the principal 
amount, the maturity of the loan, or 
collateral requirements. In negotiations 
over any of these contractual terms, 
even a lender with a very small expo-
sure has a lot of power to influence 
negotiations.  
Matters are different for financial 
covenants. Although there is less uni-
formity across syndicates for financial 
covenants than for core contractual 
terms, the typical syndicate contract 
will require lenders holding at least 
two-thirds of the value of the loan to 
agree to change a noncore contractual 
term, such as a financial covenant. 
(The minimum fractions required to 
change a noncore term range from 
one-half to three-quarters.) This 
means that in negotiations over finan-
cial covenants, a lender with a small 
exposure will seldom be decisive.   
Thus, it is plausible that loan syn-
dicates are designed to be very tough 
in contract negotiations over the core 
contractual terms — to maintain a 
credible threat to discipline borrow-
ers — while they are also designed to 
permit monitoring through stringent 
covenants that can be renegotiated 
relatively easily, thereby avoiding a 
costly default every time a covenant is 
breached. However, this is only a pre-
liminary hypothesis; further research is 
necessary to gain a definitive answer.
CONCLUSION 
Although a close lending relation-
ship with a single bank can be valuable 
to a borrowing firm, the bank gains 
monopoly power over the firm as it 
gains better information about the firm 
than other potential lenders. This idea 
was first articulated by banking schol-
ars in the 1990s, but researchers have 
only recently produced convincing 
direct evidence of the hold-up problem 
in banking relationships. Overcoming 
the hold-up problem is one motivation 
for a firm to give up some of the bene-
fits of an exclusive lending relationship 
by borrowing from multiple lenders. 
We gain a better understanding 
of what the firm gains and loses in 
borrowing from multiple lenders by 
examining the syndicated loan market, 
in which a lead bank originates a loan, 
to which other lenders then subscribe. 
For firms large enough for a syndicated 
loan to be profitable, the syndicated 
loan offers some of the aspects of rela-
tionship loans while reducing the mo-
nopoly power of any single bank. From 
the lenders’ perspective, loan syndica-
tions permit banks to make loans to 
relatively large firms while maintaining 
a diversified loan portfolio.
Recent evidence suggests that 
loan syndicates are designed to pro-
vide appropriate incentives to monitor 
the firm by the originating bank; for 
example, the share retained by the 
lead bank is larger for informationally 
opaque firms. Although the evidence 
is not yet conclusive, loan syndicates 
also appear to be designed to permit 
contractual flexibility along some 
dimensions — financial covenants 
are relatively stringent, but they are 
frequently renegotiated — while lim-
iting contractual flexibility on core 
contractual terms such as the loan rate 
and the loan maturity. Preliminary 
evidence also suggests that restrictions 
on syndicate members’ ability to sell 
their loans are designed to regulate the 
terms on which syndicated loans can 
be renegotiated.
13 Benjamin Esty and William Megginson 
find evidence that project finance syndicates 
are larger in countries where creditor rights 
are weak. Project finance syndicates make 
collateralized loans to fund particular 
investment projects, for example, a new 
power plant. Esty and Megginson interpret 
their finding as evidence that syndicates are 
designed to inhibit renegotiation in countries 
where legal sanctions for default are weak and 
lenders can be at a relative disadvantage in loan 
renegotiations. 
14 The apparent differences between the two sets 
of results are almost surely not due to different 
samples of firms or different time periods. Both 
studies use the same database, and their sample 
periods overlap substantially.  Although Sufi 
recognizes the tradeoffs involved in having 
many lenders, he doesn’t appear to view the 
evidence that renegotiation occurs routinely as 
a challenge for his conclusions. B RREFERENCES
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